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Ponzi schemes were so named after
confidence man Charles Ponzi, who
invented a scheme to profit from for
eign exchange arbitrage through the
purchase and redemption o f postal
coupons after W orld War I. Ponzi
attracted financial backing for his
schem e by offering investors enor
m ous retu rn s. As he paid early
investors the high returns they were
promised, word spread, and Ponzi
began collecting cash from investors
at a fren zied pace. However, the
postal coupon scheme did not gener
ate enough profit to pay the returns
Ponzi promised, and, in fact, he went
deeper into debt with each transac
tio n . H e was able to sustain the
scheme only by paying returns to ear
lier investors with cash received from
la ter investors. W hen au th o rities
began to investigate Ponzi’s business,
in vestors b ecam e sp o ok ed , new
investment funds dried up, and the
schem e quickly collapsed leaving
Ponzi u nable to repay any o f the
remaining investors.
This article explores the character
istics o f Ponzi schemes, the signifi
ca n ce o f Ponzi sch em es in b an k 
ru ptcy cases, and the ev id en ce
required to prove the existence of a
Ponzi schem e. Not all failed busi
nesses are the result o f illegitimate
activity. However, if a failed business
is a Ponzi scheme, the likelihood o f a
successful recovery action in bank
ruptcy is vastly improved. Over the
past three years, we have had the
opportunity to investigate several
Ponzi schemes, and in each instance

we were asked to establish both that
the debtor was indeed operating a
Ponzi scheme and the first date upon
w hich the d e b to r ’s o p e ra tio n s
became a Ponzi scheme. This can be
easy to do in instances where the
debtor’s operation is launched as a
criminal Ponzi enterprise from the
beginning. It is more difficult, how
ever, when the debtor initially oper
ates a legitimate business, but for rea
sons o f fin a n c ia l h ard sh ip , the
business gradually m orphs in to a
criminal enterprise. The bankruptcy
tru stee, o n ce ap p o in ted , quickly
encounters two things: a large body
of jilted, unsecured creditors clamor
ing for their money back and few, if
any, existing assets with which to pay
them. If the jilted creditors are to be
paid, the so u rce o f paym ent will
almost always be the lucky investors
who actually m ade m oney in the
scheme. That is, the trustee must sue
the “winners” to pay the “losers.”
The remedies available to a trustee
for this purpose are uniquely power
ful ones. But they arise only if the
trustee can show, as a threshold mat
ter, that the d ebtor was in fact an
operating Ponzi schem e. W hether
the debtor was doing so is thus a sin
gularly im p o rta n t issue. A b r ie f
description of some of the remedies
available to a trustee who succeeds in
carrying this initial burden will suffice
to show just how important the issue
is.
First, any d istrib u tio n to an
“investor” above the investor’s initial
undertaking (that is, any distribution
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in excess of principal) constitutes a
fraudulent transfer as a m atter of
law. All in te re st or o th e r “Ponzi
P ro fit” payments to investors are
therefore at risk, regardless of the
relative guilt or in n ocen ce o f the
individual investors.
Secon d , the d eb to r in a Ponzi
schem e case is presum ed to have
acted with fraudulent intent. Thus,
any and all payments by the debtor
to investors, even refunds of invested
p rincip al, are recoverable by the
trustee unless the d efen d an t can
prove both (1) good faith and (2) an
exchange of reasonable equivalent
value. The burden of proof is on the
investor, not on the trustee. Since
P on zi sch em es o fte n involve
unorthodox transactions (for exam
ple, post-dated checks), good faith is
typically difficult, if not impossible,
for the investor to establish. Thus,
even the investor’s principal is at
risk.
Third, with respect to preferential
transfers, the cases generally hold
that there is no ordinary course of
business defense in a Ponzi scheme
case, there being “nothing ordinary”
about a Ponzi operation. Since Ponzi
operators tend to pay the greatest
number of payments and the highest
paym ent am ou nts im m ed iately
b e fo re the o p e ra tio n co lla p ses
(which often corresponds more or
less to the 90-day p re fe re n c e
period), a great proportion o f the
dollars distributed by the Ponzi oper
ator are recoverable as preferences.
O f course the underlying dynamic
driving any Ponzi scheme is greed.
Investors suspend good ju d gm en t

and overlook basic due diligence in
th e ir eag ern ess to get in on the
a ctio n . In the Ponzi schem es we
investigated, investors received prof
its for short-term investments and did
not bother to annualize their returns.
Consequently, investors were desensi
tized to the ridiculousness o f their
yields. A 6% retu rn over 45 days
looks like 6%, not the approximate
50% annualized return.
The key to a good Ponzi scheme
is to make sure early investors get
their money back, since the best way
to p ro lo n g a Ponzi sch em e is
through repeat investors. Effective
operators overcom e skepticism by
having cash available to retire a ner
vous in v e sto r’s o b lig a tio n . An
investor who promptly receives his or
h er m oney b ack is o ften em b ar
rassed for having doubted the busi
ness acum en o f the operator and
may overcome this humilitation by
investing more heavily and telling his
or her friends about the great oppor
tunity. T h e afterm ath o f a Ponzi
scheme is a little like the remains of
a nuclear explosion. After the mush
room cloud dissipates, few, if any,
assets exist. The short-term winners
in a Ponzi scheme are the investors
who get out before the scheme blows
up and the pro m o ters who raise
investors’ funds for a piece of the
action or a commission but put none
of their own capital at risk.
T h e key for a trustee, then, as
ind icated , is to establish that the
d e b to r’s o p eratio n was in d eed a
Ponzi scheme. This article addresses
this issue: What proof will suffice to
establish this critical point?

This is relatively easy to prove in
instances when the debtor’s opera
tion is launched as a “pure” Ponzi
enterprise from the beginning. This
point was well explained in Merrill v.
Abbott (In re Independent Clearing
H ouse C o.), 77 B an kr. 843 (D .C .
Utah, 1987):
“The evidence before the Bankruptcy
Court... showed that the Debtors con
ducted no business operations, never gen
erated any profits or earnings, paid all
monthly disbursements to [investors]
solely from [investors’] investments, were
insolvent from the moment the fir s t
investment contract was executed, became
more insolvent with each successive con
tract, and ran their business as a Ponzi
scheme.... Thus, it was undisputed that
the Debtors’ business was conducted as a
Ponzi scheme.. . . ”
The Court held that to constitute
“in te rn a tio n a l fra u d ,” a tran sfer
need not be made with intent to hin
der, delay, or defraud a sp ecific
transferee. Rather, “The Trustee need
only show that the transfers were made
with the intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud an entity to which the Debtor was
or became indebted on or after the date
that such transfer occurred.” 77 Bankr.
860 (emphasis in original).
Since Ponzi schemes must, as a
matter of scientific necessity, eventu
ally collapse and leave some credi
tors u n p aid , on e can th e re fo re
always infer the necessary intent:
“Indeed no other reasonable inference
is possible. A Ponzi scheme cannot work
forever. The investor pool is a limited
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resource and will eventually run dry. The
perpetrator must know that the scheme
will eventually collapse as a result o f the
inability to attract new investors. The per
petrator nevertheless makes payments to
present investors, which, by definition,
are meant to attract new investors. He
must know a ll along, from the very
nature o f his activities, that the investors
at the end o f the line will lose their money.
Knowledge to a substantial certainty con
stitutes intent within the eyes o f the law. ”
77 Bankr. at 860.
Ponzi schemes generally have the
following characteristics:
1. Capital Providers. A Ponzi scheme thrives
on funds provided by third party
investors. These could be individu
als or financial institutions provid
ing cash in the form of either debt
or equity. Generally, the distinc
tion between “debt” and “equity” is
o f little importance because any
infusion of capital gives rise to an
equitable obligation by the debtor
to return it. The return of funds by
the debtor to the investor is there
fore arguably the satisfaction of a
debt, either expressed or implied.
Distinction between debt or equity
capital is also unnecessary since
the p rofitable business activity
required to service both forms of
capital is absent in a Ponzi scheme.
2. Existence of Fraud. Ponzi o p erato rs
invariably make false representa
tions to their “investors” and do so
knowingly. That is, the Ponzi oper
ator will pitch the business as if it
were legitim ate, while knowing
that new loan proceeds will be
used to repay earlier lenders not to
invest in the enterprise pitched to
the investor. Often, the only busi
ness being conducted is the raising
of investor funds. Intent is often
difficult to prove directly. This
requires a careful cataloging of the
number of investors, the amount
and timing of their investments,
the legitimate profits (if any) gen
erated from the debtor’s business
activities, and the tracing of pay
m ents from paym ent sources.

3.

Proving th at the d eb to r knew
some existing or future creditor
would go unpaid is much more
difficult, however, when the debtor
initially operates a legitimate busi
ness, encounters financial hard
ship, and reacts not by closing or
changing the business, but by bor
rowing money to keep the busi
ness afloat. If the debtor does so
knowing or suspecting that the
business is not healthy enough to
retire new debt when it comes due,
but represents otherwise to the
new lender, he or she has engaged
in the same basic deception that
“pure” Ponzi operators use from
the beginning. If, when the new
debt comes due, the debtor pays it
with yet another new loan, and
does the same thing again when
the new loan matures, he or she
has become as much a Ponzi oper
ator as Charles Ponzi himself. This
evidence generally is sufficient to
enable the trier of fact to infer that
the Ponzi operator form ed the
requisite criminal intent.
High Rates of Return. A Ponzi operator’s
pitch to investors will typically not
withstand even the most perfunc
tory due diligence by the investor.
The key for the Ponzi operator is
therefore to get people to invest
without asking too many ques
tions. T o accom plish this, the
Ponzi operator will typically do
two things: First, the operator will
o ffe r ex trem ely h igh rates o f
return, and second, actually pay
such returns to earlier investors.
This creates a level of temptation
(the so-called “greed factor”) that
is exp loited to assure a steady
stream of new investors. A Ponzi
operation will therefore usually
involve extrem ely high rates o f
return over short periods of time
and at least an initial pool of lucky
investors who actually rake in
these high returns. The payment
of extremely high returns to nontraditional lenders is particularly
probative. It shows that the debtor
knows, or at least suspects, that he

4.

would not qualify for bank financ
ing. A willingness to overpay for
credit shows desperation for new
loan funds. We have investigated
Ponzi schemes in which rates of
return ranged as high as 2,500%
per annum. No business can sus
tain even anything close to that
cost o f capital. Any debtor who
would agree to pay it can be pre
sumed to understand that there is
no hope of long-term survival.
Increasing Insolvency. A Ponzi scheme, by
its very nature, becomes increas
ingly insolvent with each business
transaction. It does so by the very
“Ponzi” nature o f the operation,
which involves at its core the pay
ment of previous loan obligations
with the proceeds of later ones.
T h e Ponzi sc h e m e ’s ability to
repay debts is solely contingent
on raising new funds, which has
the effect of deepening the insol
vency. Since both past and cur
rent obligations entail carrying
costs (p rim arily in te re s t), the
enterprise takes on m ore water
with each tra n sa c tio n . I f this
“increasing insolvency” can be
established, the debtor’s intent to
“h in d er, delay, or d efrau d ” its
creditors is presumed. The most
d ifficult part o f a fraud case—
proving that the debtor acted with
the requisite intent— is therefore
presumptively established. T h e
importance of this to the trustee’s
c o lle c tio n e ffo rts c a n n o t be
overemphasized. The touchstone
for all Ponzi operations is the con
cept o f “increasing insolvency.”
The trustee must show that, with
each new loan transaction, the
debtor becam e m ore insolvent.
To show this, the trustee might
c re a te a c h a rt th a t p lots the
d e b to r ’s cash receip ts and its
gross recurring obligations. When
each new loan is in corp orated
into the chart, it will often cause a
w ider and w ider sep a ra tio n
between income and expenses. If
th a t se p a ra tio n co n tin u e s to
increase, and the trustee can show
3
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th at the b u sin ess is n o t able
through operations to narrow the
gap, the first and most basic ele
ment of a Ponzi scheme will have
been established.
Not all hopeless businesses, how
ever, are criminal enterprises. The
trustee must also show knowledge on
the d ebtor’s part that the business
was becoming increasingly insolvent
and that the business could not sus
tain the new debt it incurred or was
likely to incur in the future. That is,
intent will be presumed only if the
trustee can establish knowledge on
the debtor’s part that its increasing
insolvency was irreversible, or that its
debt could not be retired from cash
generated by operations.
Possibly the best way to show this
is by tracing new loan proceeds to
the retirem ent of pre-existing debt
(that is, robbing Peter to pay Paul),
rather than using the funds to invest
in capital and eq u ip m en t. I f the
debtor seeks new loans at the time
pre-existing debt matures, uses the
new loan proceeds to pay old debt,
and becomes increasingly insolvent
in the process of doing so, the trier of
fact can infer the requisite knowl
edge and intent. T h e facts, taken
together, reveal (1) knowledge on
the debtor’s part that its operations
are not self-sustaining, and (2) a plan
by the debtor to stay afloat with bor
rowed funds. W hile such a debtor
can, unlike a “pure” Ponzi operator,
fall back on the “hope springs eter
nal” defense, a strong and well-orga
nized set of proofs by the trustee will
often overwhelm this defense.
The key to establishing the exis
tence of a Ponzi scheme is to demon
strate that the only source o f repay
ment to investors is funds from other
investors. Since no business activity
exists, an analysis of the cash trans
fe rre d in and ou t o f the en tity
should be su fficie n t to show the
sources and uses of funds. If there is
business activity, it is im portant to
understand the level of such activity
and to docum ent the volume and
the inadequate profitability available
4

to service the debt load. There are
trailing pieces of evidence that can
support your con clu sions on the
scheme such as computing and doc
um enting the costs o f capital and
comparing them to the profit mar
gins o f any business activity. Such
analysis highlights the ridiculousness
o f th e p ro p o sitio n sin ce Ponzi
schem e businesses can not sustain
the level of profitability required to
service the costs of invested capital.
Rarely in Ponzi schemes is money
invested in machinery, equipment,
goods, services, or even in alternative
investment vehicles like stocks and
bonds. Typically, the only disburse
m en t activity in th e ch e c k in g
account relates to payments to capi
tal providers in the forms of interest
or principal reductions on maturing
ob ligation s. Capital provider A ’s
m oney is d istrib u ted to cap ital
provider B. The cash com ing into
the entity is from capital providers,
not customers.
O ther evidence that might bear
on this issue includes:
• M aterial m isrepresentations by
the d e b to r to le n d e rs abou t
income, expenses, and prospects
• False or misleading projections
• Increased reliance on nontradi
tional lenders
• Willingness to offer and pay above
interest rates
• Failure to reveal losses, or lost
opportunities, to lenders
• Cooked books
• Bleak audit reports
• Neglect o f the business to raise
funds
• F o o lish sp en d in g to give the
appearance of success
• Preferential treatm ent o f select
lenders
The evidence required to support
a Ponzi scheme analysis is collected
through the following steps:
1. Follow the money. How are capi
tal providers being paid?
2. Analyze the business activity.
a. Are there sales?
b. Are funds generated into the
com pany from cu stom ers or

investors?
C.Is the business profitable?
d. Does the business ju stify the
amount of capital and its cost?
e. Is there a lot of activity in repay
ing investors? Perhaps more so
than sales activity?
3. Determine whether the investors’
returns are exorbitant. Most legiti
mate businesses can not sustain
levels of profitability required to
service and retire Ponzi scheme
capital.
The analysis and documentation
resulting from these steps will drive
and su p p o rt your co n clu sio n s
regarding the nature of the debtor’s
operations and assist the trustee’s
efforts in recovering actions. X
Patrick M. O’Keefe, CPA, ABV, BVAL, CTP,
is managing member of O’Keefe & Associ
ates. His firm has worked with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Postal Service,
and Internal Revenue Service in investigat
ing Ponzi schemes. He can be contacted at
( 2 4 8 ) 5 9 3 -4 8 1 0 or a t pokeefe@ okeefe
andassociates.com. Russell D. Long, CPA,
ABV, is a senior associate at O’Keefe &
Associates. Michael S. McElwee, Esq., is a
partner in the Trial Practice Group at Var
num, Riddering, Schmidt & Howlett. He spe
cializes in com mercial litigation w ith an
emphasis on Article 2 of the Uniform Com
mercial Code (Sales of Goods).

CPA EXPERT RECEIVES
AWARD FOR EXCELLENCE
For the ninth consecutive year,
CPA Expert has received an APEX
Award for Publication Excellence.
This year’s award was part of the
19th annual awards program rec
ognizing excellence in publica
tions work by professional com
municators. The APEX Awards
program is sponsored by Com
m u n ication s C on cep ts, In c.,
Springfield, VA, which helps pub
lishing, public relations, and mar
keting professionals to improve
publications and com m unica
tions programs through focused
services.
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HISTORY OF STA-HOME
Sta-Home was a collection of entities
that provided home health care ser
vices primarily paid for by Medicaid
to residents o f Mississippi. R eim 
bursements were limited to the cost
o f p rovid in g th e serv ice, w hich
apparently precluded the possibility
of profitability. Sta-Home completed
a corporate reorganization in 1995,
which ultimately led to the litigation
with the IRS.
Sta-Home was approximately 20
years old at the time of the reorgani
zation. According to the courts’ deci
sions, it:
• Had a w ell-estab lish ed b ran d
name.
• Had well-documented intellectual
capital (manuals, procedures).
• Had a “generally good rep uta
tion.”
• Had a c e rtific a te o f n eed and
accreditation by the JCAHO (Joint
Commission on the Accreditation
of Healthcare Organizations).
• W as th e la rg e s t p ro v id er o f
home healthcare services in Mis
sissippi.
For perspective, as shown in Fig
ure 1, Sta-Home’s scale of operations
had in creased dram atically from
1991 to 1995. A question immedi
ately comes to mind: Why would the
owners grow the business to this
extent if there were no chance o f
economic success?

The appropriate use o f the market
more correct than the Tax Court’s
approach in healthcare industry valu
decision, while Ken Patton believes
ation is one of the most critical issues
that the Tax C ourt’s decision was
confronting the appraisal industry
m ore c o rre ct.2 Ken Patton brings
today. Many h ea lth ca re industry
years o f healthcare industry valua
appraisers believe that market data is
tion expertise (although fewer years
often unreliable or even misleading
than Mark D ietrich), and more to
and must be used with abundant cau
the point, his knowledge of this spe
tion. Therefore, they focus primarily
cific market through his experience
on the in co m e ap p ro ach . T h ese
valuing other healthcare companies
appraisers cite such factors as local
in the region during this time.3
Medicaid coverage differences, the
monopsonistic market power of local
THE KEY VALUATION ISSUE AND
health insurers, the lack of sufficient
VALUATION EXPERTS
data to determine comparability, and
In Caracci, the key valuation issue was
regulatory restrictions on the use of
the value o f the assets transferred
market data contained in the Stark
from a not-for-profit entity to a forregulations.
profit entity.
Appraisers who believe that the
The valuation expert for the tax
m arket approach, along with the
payers, Sta-Home entities and the
incom e approach, should be given
Caraccis, was Allen D. Hahn, a direc
sig n ific a n t w eight focu s on the
to r in P ricew a terh o u se C o o p ers
im portance o f actual transactions
Northeast Region Corporation Valu
and not substituting one’s judgment
ation Consulting Group. The valua
for that of the market. Where both
tion expert for the IRS was Charles
groups agree is that use o f market
A. Wilhoite, a managing director of
data in the h e a lth c a re industry
Willamette Management Associates
req u ires sig n ifica n t skill and inand th e n a tio n a l d ire c to r o f its
depth analysis. In this article two
health care industry services. In its
leading experts, who have contrast
opinion, the Tax Court recognized
ing views on the topic, explore those
the experience and qualifications of
issues in depth.
the experts.
POSITION OF THE PARTIES
To illustrate our view
This case involved the conver
p o in ts, we discuss th ese
sion o f M ississippi’s largest
Figure 1. Sta-Home's Revenues and Expenses
issues in the context of the
hom e h ealth agency ch ain ,
(199 1 -1 9 9 5 )
Fifth C ircu it’s reversal o f
Sta-Home, from tax exempt to
Year
Revenue
Expenses
Net Income
the Tax Court’s opinion in
for-profit status in 1995.4 The
C a ra cci,1 w hich poses a
entity had more than $44 mil
1991
$ 1 1 ,7 9 9 ,7 2 1
$ 1 1 ,7 3 6 ,0 6 1
($ 6 3 ,6 6 0 )
n u m b er o f q u estio n s to
lion in revenues and a loss of
1992
$ 1 8 ,4 4 2 ,0 7 2
$ 1 8 ,4 1 4 ,3 1 5
$ 2 7 ,7 5 7
business valuation profes
$433,390 in that year, as well
$ 2 5 ,1 6 2 ,7 0 1
1993
$ 2 5 ,2 0 8 ,2 5 5
($ 4 5 ,5 5 4 )
sionals. With respect to the
as a large share of the Missis
valuation issues only, Mark
sippi m arket. Such con v er
1994
$ 3 6 ,8 8 2 ,9 5 7
$ 3 7 ,1 4 1 ,6 8 6
($ 2 5 8 ,7 2 9 )
D ietrich believes that the
sions were com m on at this
$ 4 4 ,1 0 1 ,8 4 9
1995
$ 4 4 ,5 3 5 ,2 3 9
($ 4 3 3 ,3 9 0 )
Fifth Circuit’s decision was
time. They took place against
1
2
3
4

118 TC 379 (2002), rev ’d:. 456 F.3d 444, 98 AFTR2d 2006-5264: (CA-5, 2006).
The authors offer no opinion as to any of the legal aspects of this case.
Neither of the authors (or their firms) was involved in the case; therefore, they are relying solely on publicly available information.
The entities operated under state certificates of need.
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the expectation5 of a prospective pay
m en t system (P P S )6 re p la c in g
Medicare’s cost-based system for pay
ing for home healthcare. The PPS
was ultimately adopted in the Bal
anced Budget Act o f 1997. It paid
agencies in 60-day episodes o f care
rath er than on the basis o f costs
incurred. The cost-based system had
led to the sp end in g o f excessive
amounts on delivering care. Prior to
th e a d o p tio n o f th e PPS, h om e
health agencies were often acquired
by hospitals (and there was an active
market in Mississippi). The hospitals,
which were already paid by Medicare
under a PPS, could therefore shift
costs to the home health agency and
obtain higher reim bursem ent for
the same services.
The conversion was audited by
the IRS, which found that the taxexem pt entities had approximately
$18.5 million in net equity value that
had been improperly transferred to
the su bsequent owners. T h e new
owners maintained that the liabilities
assumed exceeded the value o f the
assets received. The IRS asserted that
the net excess benefit of $18.5 mil
lion triggered excise taxes and penal
ties of more then $250 million. The
Tax Court subsequently reduced this
to $46 million.

TAX COURT OPINION
According to Judge Laro’s opinion, a
valuation prepared contem porane
ously with the tran saction at the
insistence of special tax counsel for
Sta-Home was initially rejected by
that counsel for failure to conform
to Revenue R uling 5 9 -6 0 7 and to
address the existence o f intangible
assets. A second appraisal found that
the equity value of the entities was
negative, although the Tax Court
reco rd in d icates that special tax
counsel remained concerned about
the quality o f the appraisal.

THE STANDARD OF VALUE
A key issue in the case was the con
flict between the normalization of
earnings adjustments available to a
hypothetical willing buyer and those
available only to a specific buyer or
specific class of buyers, and whether
the latter constituted fair m arket
value. The following is quoted from
the Tax Court’s opinion:
“During 1995, the primary buyers o f
home health agencies were hospitals, nurs
ing homes, and other home health agen
cies. They were able to take advantage o f
a mechanism known as ‘cost-shifting.'"
Cost shifting was commonly used
in this time period by hospitals that
were paid u nd er a PPS. T h e PPS
generated a fixed payment so that if
costs could be tran sferred to the
home health agency, additional rev
enue could be generated with no
additional cost. The inclusion of this
attribute by the Tax Court was criti
cal in the determination o f fair mar
ket value.
The taxpayer’s expert, Hahn, val
ued the cost gap at $667,000 based
upon his view that a buyer would
have a one-year ben efit from that
strategy. The Tax Court disagreed:
“This value is too low. The cost gaps
were available under the then-current
reimbursement program. They would cease
to exist under a PPS. Although there had
been discussions o f a PPS fo r several years,
Congress had passed no such legislation
at the time o f the transfer, and there is no
evidence that the prospect o f such legisla
tion had a negative effect upon the value
o f home health care agencies. ”

HAHN'S VALUATION APPROACHES
T h e Tax C ourt reviewed and cri
tiqued each expert’s use of the mar
ket approach. Hahn also relied pri
marily on an adjusted balance sheet
methodology (a version of the cost

approach), in which he valued the
trained workforce and certificate of
need. Hahn placed considerably less
relia n ce on m arket com p arables
becau se p u rp o rted com p arab les
were “idiosyncratic” and lacked suffi
cient detail.
The Tax Court also noted Hahn’s
testimony that guideline public com
panies were not appropriate compa
rables because home health care was
part o f a b road er service m ix. In
effect, th ere were no “pure-play”
public companies.

WILHOITE'S VALUATION APPROACHES
Wilhoite relied primarily on the mar
ket approach utilizing both guide
line public companies and guideline
a cq u isitio n s. T h e T ax C o u rt
appeared to indicate a clear prefer
en ce for this approach. W ilhoite
derived revenue pricing multiples
for MVIC, the use o f which was a key
issue in the Fifth Circuit’s decision.8
The Tax Court discussed the two
com p arab le acq u ired com panies
deemed most like Sta-Home accord
ing to W ilh oite. T h e C ourt then
went on to develop its own view of
the proper multiple.
T h ere was no discussion by the
Tax Court o f differences in payor
mix between the purported compa
rables and Sta-Home, which was 95%
M ed icare-b ased . T h e c o u rt did
observe th at M ississippi had the
largest per capita spending on home
h ealth in the cou ntry u n d er the
Medicare program, but that speaks
more to volume of services than rate
per unit o f service— and the latter
drives profits. The court did allude
to H ahn’s testimony that successful
home health agencies had non-gov
ern m en t patients and m ore prof
itable lines of business, such as infu
sion therapy. These are all critical,
and likely conclusive, differences as
to comparability. Regardless of these

5 A virtual certainty in the view of co-author Mark Dietrich. The Tax Court stated in its opinion that “Natl. expenditures for home nursing care grew from $3.8 billion in
1990 to $20.5 billion in 1997,” a circumstance that guaranteed congressional action and always has.
6 A PPS pays for services on the basis of a fee set in advance.
7 1959-1 CB 237.
8 Of particular note is the Service’s expert’s reliance on revenue multiples from out of market transactions and public companies. This is a notoriously bad multiple in the
view of many healthcare valuation experts and one specifically banned by the later-issued Stark II regulations discussed below.
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concerns about the comparables, the
Tax Court held that the taxpayers
owed a crushing am ount of excise
taxes and penalties.

APPELLATE COURT OPINION
The Fifth Circuit severely criticized
the IRS for its numerous errors in
the assessment process, Judge Laro
for engaging in valuation, and Wil
hoite for his failure to understand
the Mississippi m arketplace. Th e
Fifth Circuit first observed that StaH om e had looked fo r a hospital
buyer unsuccessfully. W here Judge
Laro had been dismissive of the tax
payer’s expert, Hahn, the Fifth Cir
cuit embraced him, observing that
the IRS had also attempted to retain
him and that he spent eight weeks in
M ississippi w orking on the case9
com pared to W ilh oite’s two days.
Wilhoite’s lack of experience in the
home healthcare industry in particu
lar, as opposed to his general valua
tion experience, was also cited. Sig
nificantly, the Fifth C ircuit noted
that: “W ilhoite used market-based
and incom e-based approaches to
assign values to all Sta-Home’s assets
in general, without valuing any o f StaH ome’s assets in particular....” (Italics
added for emphasis).

SYNONOMOUS STANDARD OF VALUE?
C aracci im p licitly raises an issue
regard in g the standard o f value.
Without question, all of the parties
believed that “fair market value” was
applicable. The potential for sale of
Sta-Home was discussed by the Tax
Court and even more by the Fifth
Circuit. Although fair market value is
gen erally co n sid ered to re fe r to
hypothetical willing buyers and sell
ers, it is evident that the very specific
circum stances o f potential buyers
were considered.
Wilhoite used a method known as
“cost shifting” in his analysis. Eco
nomic profits are created by charg
ing a portion of the expense base to
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another business unit. Cost shifting
was in frequent use in the region as a
m eans o f c re a tin g value fo r
M edicare hom e h ealth agencies.
Because cost shifting incorporates
b u sin ess syn erg ies, it raises the
specter that the standard o f value
had really morphed into investment
value, which is defined in the “Inter
national Glossary of Business Valua
tion Terms” as “the value to a partic
ular investor based on individual
requirements and expectations.”101If
virtually every market participant has
the potential to use the cost shifting
b en efits, investm ent value m ight
effectively become synonymous with
fair market value.
T h e th ird stan d ard o f value,
in trin sic value, is d efin ed in the
International Glossary as “the value
that an investor considers, on the
basis o f an evaluation o f available
facts, to be the ‘true’ or ‘real’ value
that will becom e the market value
when other investors reach the same
conclusion.”
Why is intrinsic value important
in this case? First there was great
debate about the future o f hom e
health care as a business due to the
implementation of PPS. Market par
ticipants in the geographical area
had widely different views. Market
transactions occurring contempora
neously and after the valuation date
indicated that Medicare dependent
hom e health agencies had value.
Taking the opposite position with
respect to Sta-Home clearly reflected
a d ifferent view o f the com pany’s
intrinsic prospects.
Second, the valuation o f health
care en tities can be very volatile
based on potential change in reim
bursement rates. Note carefully the
use o f th e word “p o te n tia l.”
M edicare changes are often first
rumored, followed by proposals that
may not be implemented for a year
or more, and then the actual imple
m en ta tio n . T h e analyst is left to

make key decisions about prospec
tive economic conditions o f a busi
ness in the face o f both great and
unique uncertainties. Without ques
tion, actual market transactions can
differ from an individual analyst’s
belief about the future. The circum
stan ces o f Sta-H om e re fle c t this
conundrum . W hile hindsight may
give comfort to an analyst’s position,
appraisers must look at the broader
m arket and attem pt to reco n cile
actual m ark et activity with th e ir
expectations and the expectations of
others.

KEY REGULATORY ISSUES IN HEALTHCARE
C ertain regulatory structures dis
cussed h ere were n ot in place or
well-understood at the time o f the
Sta-Home conversion. However, they
are critical to assessing the relevance
of the Caracci decision to appraisals
in today’s marketplace.
The following are excerpts from a
synopsis of the anti-kickback statute
extracted from an advisory opinion
of the Office of the Inspector Gen
eral:
“The anti-kickback statute makes it a
criminal offense knowingly and willfully
to offer, pay, solicit, or receive any remu
neration to induce or reward referrals o f
items or services payable by a fed era l
health care program. See section 1128B(b)
o f the Act. Where remuneration is paid
purposefully to induce or reward referrals
o f items or services paid fo r by a federal
health care program, the anti-kickback
statute is violated. By its terms, the statute
ascribes criminal liability to parties on
both sides o f an impermissible ‘kickback’
transaction. For purposes o f the anti-kickback statute, ‘remuneration ’ includes the
transfer o f anything o f value, directly or
indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in
kind.
A buyer paying a seller for the
profits associated with the buyer’s
subsequent provision of new services
to the seller’s patients may well be

9 These facts do not appear in the Tax Court decision.
10 American Society of Appraisers Business Valuation Standards, Glossary, last revised June 2005. www.appraisers.org.
11 See Office of the Inspector General Advisory Opinion No. 03-12.

7

Fall 2007

CPAE xpert

seen as paying a prohibited kickback
fo r fu tu re refe rra ls, p articu larly
when the sellers remain employed by
or active in the business.12

VALUATION QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE
CASE
At this point, the authors engage in
some point-counterpoint by address
ing valuation questions raised by the
Tax Court and Fifth Circuit’s deci
sions.
What is required for market comparability?

Dietrich: Payment m echanism s are
one of the most fascinating things
about health care. Most health care
is covered by private insurance or
government programs like Medicare
(as in Sta-Home) or Medicaid. What
is not widely understood is that the
level of payment for those services
varies radically from state to state
and even m arket to m arket. Most
urban markets are dominated by a
few health insurers who hold signifi
cant influence over the fees paid to
providers. Very few insurers have
national market coverage, and those
th at do have sig n ific a n t m arket
share in only a few states.13 In order
to use a guideline public company
method or a guideline acquisition,
the analyst would need to look at
the payor mix for both the guideline
and the subject and see if they were
similar. In a poor state like Missis
sip p i, th e in su ra n c e m a rk et is
u n likely to have b een attractiv e
because most patients would have
had Medicaid, which pays the least.
This would have made the out-ofmarket guideline transactions and
public companies worthless.
Patton: The payment mechanism
is clearly one of the most important
facto rs in h ea lth care valu ation.
Reim bursem ent rates and sources
vary by region and by state or even
locality. Mississippi is a poor state that
was experiencing a surge in home
h ea lth visits, as com p ared with

n a tio n a l activity. At the tim e, it
shared these characteristics with the
nearby states of Alabama, Louisiana,
Arkansas, and portions of Tennessee
and Kentucky. A market comparison
to publicly traded companies or indi
vidual transactions outside the geo
graphic region would likely be prob
lem a tic. N ev ertheless, th e re was
acquisition activity in the aforemen
tioned states in Medicare-based agen
cies, and demand for them was evi
dent. Mercer Capital had observed
market pricing in the range of $10 to
$15 per visit for Medicare-based com
panies in the region.
Can appraisers differ reasonably about the implications
o f a foreseeable change?

Dietrich: Perhaps the most important
issue raised in C aracci is the Tax
C o u rt’s sp ecific re je c tio n o f the
impending change to a PPS, which
was the basis o f H ah n ’s position.
Medicare had been converting vari
ous healthcare industry sectors from
cost-based and other reimbursement
systems to PPS in order to control
rapidly expanding costs. There was
no d o u b t PPS was co m in g and,
therefore, the change was reasonably
foreseeable on the valuation date.
Patton: Although there was little
doubt that the change to PPS was
coming, there was apparently consid
erable doubt as to the precise timing
and the im plications o f its im ple
m entation. The prevailing tem po
rary paym ent system (P IP ) had
placed considerable strain on the
financial resources of Sta-Home and
oth er hom e health care agencies.
Yet, the company continued to grow
the base of visits. Does this speak to a
different view on the implication of
the ultim ate shift to PPS? O th er
companies were amassing size under
a general theory that a well-operated
company could prosper under PPS.
Notwithstanding the ultim ate wis
dom of that position (based on a
subsequent event), companies in the

region were increasing their size in
the belief that customer accumula
tion created value.
Does "market data" necessarily apply to the subject
interest being valued?

Dietrich: Another problem is the con
flict between the Fifth Circuit’s view
that Sta-Home had pursued buyers
unsuccessfully and the Tax Court’s
a p p a re n t dism issal o f this. It is
important to understand that strate
gic buyers in a market do not need
to buy every player in that market.
Generally, they will buy only a suffi
cie n t mass to service the m arket
area. T h ere are antitrust im plica
tions to owning too m uch m arket
share. If the hospitals in Sta-Home’s
service area had already acquired
home health agencies, they would be
unlikely to acquire another.
Patton: A m arket for M edicaredepend ent hom e health agencies
clearly existed in the region. Yet, was
there a market for this specific com
pany based on conditions in Missis
sippi? As the geographical m arket
shrinks, the analysis moves away
from hypothetical buyers and sellers
to a very specific list of each. In this
case, Sta-Home would be the seller,
and the list of buyers was thought to
be very limited. At the same time,
why was it appropriate to limit the
list o f likely buyers to Mississippibased entities? An analyst should
not substitute his or her judgm ent
fo r th at o f the m ark etp lace and
assume his or her analysis considers
every reasonable type o f buyer. In
many respects, courts in these types
o f cases began to move toward an
in v estm en t value stan d ard th at
m ig h t well be re a s o n a b le in an
industry highly influenced by regula
tions and dom inated by a narrow
payment structure.
When does data become "irrelevant history"?

D ietrich: H isto rica l tra n sa ctio n s
would have been increasingly irrele

12 See, McLeod Regional Medical Center to Pay U.S. Over $15 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations, U.S. Department of Justice Press Release, 11/1/02.
13 See, Government Accounting Office Private Health Insurance: Number and Market Share of Carriers in the Small Group Health Insurance Market.
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vant m easures as the PPS
loomed ever closer, at least
to th e e x te n t they w ere
based on the cost gap. Com
parability can be a function
of time. If a major change in
th e re im b u rse m e n t p ro 
gram occurs, comparability
is lost. Therefore, one must
be able to relate the reim 
bursem ent systems to the
timing of the transaction.
P a tto n : My c o -a u th o r
should be given great credit
for emphasizing this crucial point.
The viability of any health care busi
ness is extremely exposed to the pay
ment system. To the extent that pay
ments are made by a governm ent
entity (Medicare, Medicaid, or local
tax support), the prospects for that
b u sin ess can (an d d o) ch a n g e
greatly as reim bursem ent changes.
Home health care literally exploded
in the early 1990s. It was obvious that
som e re a c tio n from the U n ited
States gov ern m en t would occu r.
Transactions that occurred during
the timeframe of growth may not be
relevant to a specific valuation. The
underlying conditions are ju st not
com parable. Nevertheless, transac
tions for M edicare-based agencies
continued to occur within the region
for several years after 1995 at pre1995 levels. This was apparently due
to the differences in outlook for the
industry and the impact of PPS. The
im portant point is, however, that
allegedly com parable transactions
can become dated literally overnight
as the reimbursement rules change.
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ment system in October 2000.]
adjustments to eligibility an d
fraud and abuse reduction efforts
were intended to reduce spending
and redirect the benefit toward
briefer, more intense care.
Changes in spending an d use
between 1997 and 1999 demon
strate that these changes had
some dramatic effects (McCall et
al. 2001): Total Medicare spend
ing on home health fell 52 per
cent. . . ”
of the Medicare Payment Advisory
Com m ission, established by C on
gress as part of the Balanced Budget
A ct o f 1 997 to advise it a b o u t
needed changes. Equally important,
extremely rapid growth in revenues
in a particular industry sub-sector is
co m p ellin g evid ence that futu re
growth is likely to be curtailed. For
example, this happened in the sum
m er o f 2005 with respect to high
tech im aging after fo u r years o f
rapid growth, when payments for
diagnostic exams, such as magnetic
residence imaging (MRI) and com
puted tomography (CT) were cur
tailed and positron emission tomog
raphy (PET) was brought within the
purview o f the Stark Laws, which
govern physician self-referral for
Medicare and Medicaid patients.
As the present author noted in an
a rtic le ,14 discussing the then ju streleased T ax C o u rt’s d ecision in
Caracci:

What does it mean to be reasonably informed o f the
relevant facts?

“Moreover, these cost shifting strategies
have been the subject o f numerous civil
a n d crim in al proceedings under the
Medicare Fraud and Abuse Statute. In
fact, MedPAC’s current [2002] report15
notes that:

Dietrich: Knowledge o f im pending
legislative changes in h ealth care,
even if several years in the future, is
critical to developing a realistic cash
flow forecast. Many of these changes
are driven by the recommendation

The new payment system’s [The pay
ment system was changed from a costbased system to an interim system with
stricter payment limits in 1997, then
changed again to the prospective pay

Allowing for the inherent distor
tions in reporting caused by the cost
shifting strategy used by hospitals
with respect to home health agen
cies, Figure 2 presents a graph that
illustrates the four-year margin, from
1 9 9 7 -2 0 0 0 , on M ed icare h om e
health business for hospitals (the
arguably strategic class o f acquirer
that was the basis for the Tax Court
decision). This shows the decreased
sp en d in g in th o se years, w hich
occurred even though the PPS was
n o t fin ally im p lem en ted due to
delays u n til 2 0 0 0 . T h e b o tto m
dropped out two years before the
implementation.
What is astounding about the Tax
Court decision is that this informa
tion was known at the time of the
trial; the court either was unaware of
it or ignored it. The information very
clearly demonstrates that Hahn was
correct. The court’s rationale seem
ingly cannot be that the information
came after the valuation date as can
be seen clearly from the following
statement by the court concerning
post-valuation date data.16
“H om e health agencies rem ained
under a cost reimbursement system until
September 30, 1999, when legislation
passed by Congress in 1997 providing a
PPS fo r home health agencies took fu ll
effect. T he H ea lth Care F in a n c ia l
Administration (HCFA) encountered
problems implementing the system, and it

14 “Valuation, Tax Exemption, ‘Fair Market Value,’ and The Tax Court (Caracci, et al\. Commissioner)”, Medical Management Advisor, May, 2002.
15 Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy, March 2002; see page 93 forward.
16 Later in the opinion, the court stated that H ahn’s inclusion of a one-year “cost gap” should have been a two-year “cost gap,” apparently because the PPS was, in fact,
passed in 1997, two years after the Sta-Home transaction.
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was not finally implemented until Octo
ber 1, 2000. ”
The requirement for regional mar
ket value evidence is now spelled out
in the Stark Laws. Although imple
m en ted well a fter the Sta-H om e
transaction, abuses in valuing such
transactions are a principal reason
for the rule:
“Fair market value means the value
in arm ’s-length transactions consistent
with general market value. ‘General mar
ket value’ means the price that an asset
would bring as the result o f bona fide bar
gain in g between well-informed buyers
and sellers who are not otherwise in a
position to generate business fo r the other
party; or the compensation that would be
included in a service agreement as a
result o f bona fid e bargaining between
well-informed parties to the agreement
who are not otherwise in a position to
generate business for the other party, on
the date o f acquisition or at the time o f the
service agreement. Usually the fa ir market
price is the price at which bona fide sales
have been consummated fo r assets o f like
type, quality, and quantity in a particu
lar market at the time of acquisition.17
“Moreover, the definition o f fa ir mar
ket value’ in the statute and regulation is
qualified in ways that do not necessarily
comport with the usage o f the term in
stan d ard v alu ation techniques a n d
methodologies. For example, the methodol
ogy must exclude valuations where the
parties to the transactions are at arm ’s
length but in a position to refer to one
another. ” 178
The following clarifying statement
should be included immediately fol
lowing the standard definition of fair
market value: Reasonable knowledge o f
the relevant facts contemplates an under
standing o f the regulatory environment
fo r health care entities.
P atton : It is surely essen tial to
understand the legal and regulatory
structure. Once again, however, mar
17
18
19
20
21

10

ket data from relevant transactions
appear to offer a different interpre
tation of the specific implications of
the prospective changes in the home
health care industry. Nevertheless,
the comments above are extremely
im p o rta n t in u n d erstan d in g the
rules of valuation in a highly regu
lated industry such as healthcare.
How does the valuation analyst balance historical results
with changes in the strategic position o f the industry and
varying views o f the industry?

Dietrich: The single most powerful
tool for differentiating “strategic”
value inherent in acquisition prices
from fair market value is a disciplined
application of the income approach
on a stand-alone basis. If the value
in d ica tio n s u n d er the m arket
approach cannot be sustained on a
stand-alone basis,19 the analyst needs
to perform an analysis to justify a
crossover from strategic value to fair
market value in the marketplace.20 In
other sectors of the economy, such as
banking, most, if not all, buyers have
“strategic” opportunities from things
such as economies of scale. Because
the definition of fair market value in
health care is qualified by the regula
tory environment, only certain types
of otherwise strategic adjustments can
be co n sid ered . E ach category o f
“strategic” opportunity must be iden
tified, evaluated for appropriateness
under the statutes and regulations,
and then, if appropriate, included in
the valuation model (typically a dis
counted cash flow) to justify the value
co n clu sio n u n d er the in com e
approach. The value indications of
the different approaches cannot be
said to have been reconciled absent
such an undertaking.
For example, it might be appro
priate to value a subject in a sector
that is being consolidated on the
basis of consolidator transactions if
the consolidators are active in the

subject’s service area. In that case,
otherwise strategic adjustments such
as a lower cost o f capital, h igh er
growth rates, and lower operating
costs might be appropriate normal
ization adjustm ents in an incom e
approach.21
At th e sam e tim e, and m ore
im portant, it is incum bent on the
analyst to elim inate the possibility
that market data may have included
strategic considerations that violate
the Stark laws, Anti-kickback Statute,
or IRS regulations and rulings for
exempt entities; Caracci, after all, was
about excise taxes for an excess ben
efit transaction. In the two opinions,
it is not clear whether there was testi
mony abou t the ap p rop riaten ess
from a regulatory standpoint of con
sidering acquisition multiples based
on agencies that included infusion
or resp iratory therapy. T h e T ax
Court made it clear that Hahn, who
was a leading expert in this area,
eliminated them (appropriately):
“From these privately held transac
tions, Hahn excluded sales o f privately
held home health agencies that provided
sophisticated ‘infusion or respiratory ther
apy’ because those could attract reim
bursement at a higher rate than those
available to the more traditional home
health care agencies such as Sta-Home. ”
Patton: An analyst must consider
the regulatory structure. Once again,
this is a situation in which many of
the prospective buyers are likely to
view acquisition targets from the per
spective of investment value. Hence,
fair m arket value and investm ent
value begin to merge.
Can a business that appears to be losing money in
perpetuity have goodwill, or is there the potential for
creating value even when there is no direct way to
create profits?

Dietrich: This question is certainly
one that often confronts appraisers.

420 CFR 411.351 (Emphasis added).
Medicare Program; Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care Entities With Which They Have Financial Relationships (Phase II); Interim Final Rule; 69 Fed. Reg. 16053.
Damodoran describes stand-alone value in his writings on evaluating acquisitions. www.stem.nyu.edu/~adamodar/.
See Dietrich, “Understanding the Difference Between Strategic and Fair Market Value in Consolidating Industries,” 21 Business Valuation Review 77 (June 2002).
Ibid.
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I believe the prevailing view among
appraisers who limit themselves to
the healthcare industry is that if one
cannot generate a cash return, one
generally can n o t have in tan gible
value. Because the definition of fair
market value is constrained by what
is legally permissible (for example, a
cocaine dealership has no fair mar
ket value because it is illegal), one
cannot ascribe fair market value to
potential exit strategies from a losing
business that are inconsistent with
the law.
Outside this regulatory constraint,
a business that always loses money
may have value to a larger entity due
to eco n o m ie s o f scale o r o th e r
arguably strategic opportunities as
discussed in the preceding section. A
simple proscribed example would be
a physician practice that earns the
physician less than a reason ab le
salary, but generates significant rev
enues to a hospital through admis
sions and tests. The practice has a
large value to the hospital, but the
hospital cannot pay for that value
since it violates both the Stark laws
and the Anti-kickback Statute.
Value may exist on other than a
stand-alone basis in such a circum
stance as Sta-Home, but demonstrat
ing that value to be consistent with
fair market value is a required and
significant burden on the appraiser
and the parties to any transaction.
Patton: The Fifth Circuit places
great reliance on a strain of thought
that Sta-H om e’s operations could
not have goodwill because the court
could not identify a stream o f prof
itability. Consider the following com
ment by the court:
“For Sta-Home, the overwhelming
dependence on Medicare reimbursement
meant that added revenue meant added
reimbursement costs, which in turn, gen
erated greater losses.”
Given the growth in revenue of
276% evident in Figure 1 and the
strategies of similar companies, why
didn’t Sta-Home just stop growing if
the owners really believed that there
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was no hope of an economic return?
The Tax Court explained that it
believed that this apparently illogical
conclusion made sense: It found that
Sta-Home had the potential to make
a profit, which demonstrated that its
assets had substantial fair m arket
value.
There is a disconnect between the
court’s theory and the behavior of
the owners o f Sta-H om e and the
owners o f other com panies in the
marketplace.
“To operate despite their perennial
cash-flow problems, their lack o f prof
itability, their increasing operating losses,
and their increasing deficits.
... its patients— would only enable the
agencies to lose money fo r the indefinite
future. ”
Can a business that appears to be
losing m oney in p erpetuity have
goodwill? Here again, the growth of
the size o f the business could indi
cate an alternative theory about the
c re a tio n o f value n o t lin k ed to
reported profitability.
A gain, th e re is a d is c o n n e ct
between the business strategy of StaHome (and other similar companies
in the region) and the observations
of the Fifth Circuit. Rational people
stop amassing assets when it continu
ally increases their losses unless they
believe that there is an econom ic
return on some basis in the future.
The Fifth Circuit posits the follow
ing a rg u m en t th at goodw ill is
derived from excess earnings; there
fore, in this case, there can be no
goodwill. It states:
“The Tax Court’s mistaken belief that
Sta-Home’s intangible assets had sub
stantial fa ir market value led it to ignore
its own long-recognized position that
unprofitable intangible assets do not con
tribute to fa ir market value unless those
assets produce net income or earnings.
Revenue Ruling 59-60 requires the IRS to
assign zero value to unprofitable intangi
ble assets. See Rev. Rule 59-60, 1959-1
C.B. 237 ( ‘The presence o f goodwill and

its value, therefore, rests upon the excess
o f net earnings over and above a fa ir
return on the net tangible assets. ’) ”
Putting aside the Fifth C ircuit’s
legal position, the cou rt’s im plicit
econom ic position requires discus
sion. First and foremost, all value is a
function of future benefits. The past
may be instructive, but is not deter
minative of value. The core question
for any asset or business value is
“What benefits will it produce in the
future?”
Most assets and businesses have
the p ro sp ect o f a visible positive
return in the hands o f its current
owners. Value is most visible when
n et in com e is presen t. However,
every valuation analyst has to be
open to an alternative view o f value
creation that is not apparent until
the u ltim ate sale o f th e assets.
Appraisers often place virtually all of
the value in a discounted cash flow
analysis in the terminal value; there
fo re , in terim p ro fitab ility is n o t
essential.
W hat happens, however, when
profitability is never likely or even
expected to occur in the hands o f
the cu rren t owner? Can goodwill
exist? O f course it can, and it does.
How could this be true? In one sim
ple scenario, value in excess of cost
can be created by accum ulating a
cu sto m er base. By se llin g the
amassed base in bulk, there is value
to the buyer, which is often a typical
market participant. The seller real
izes the value o f its efforts to accu
mulate the customers.
Did the Tax Court and Wilhoite err by basing the
valuation o f the assets on the market value o f invested
capital?

Patton: The Tax Court and Wilhoite
based the value of the assets, includ
ing the intangible assets, on the mar
ket value o f invested capital. T h e
Fifth Circuit said this was in error,
and the value of the assets, including
the in ta n g ib le assets, shou ld be
based on a valuation o f the direct
value of the assets themselves. Was
11
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the Tax Court in error? From a valu
ation perspective, the answer is an
emphatic “no.”
T h e F ifth C irc u it favors an
ap p roach to valuing goodwill by
valuing the asset directly. Further, it
seems not to accept the notion that
the value o f the assets must equal
the value of the liabilities by refer
ring to it as an accounting concept.
This is incorrect. The value o f the
assets will, by definition, from a val
uation perspective, be the value of
the total invested capital plus other
liabilities and non-operating assets.
Additionally, the concept of direct
valuation o f goodwill will require
the use of income methods that ulti
mately require the determination of
total invested capital.
Dietrich: Perhaps both courts got
ahead of their knowledge in writing
th e ir op in ion s. T h e left-h an d or
asset side o f the accounting equa
tion must, o f necessity, equal the
right-hand or invested capital side.

T h e Fifth Circuit thought a m ore
m e a n in g fu l re s u lt co u ld be
obtained from the left-hand side,
while the Tax Court believed in the
invested capital approach inherent
in use of the guideline methods in
which individual assets are not val
ued. It is a useful exercise to allo
cate value to the assets after making
a p re lim in a ry d e te rm in a tio n o f
invested capital, and the present
author often does so both analyti
cally and in reports. Identifying the
a m o u n t o f in ta n g ib le value is
im portant in healthcare appraisal
because this is where the regulatory
risk is greatest.

LOOKING AHEAD
The opinions of the Tax Court and
the Fifth C ircu it in C aracci raise
very interesting questions for busi
ness valuation professionals. Th e
authors have attempted to address
several of them. While they may not
a g ree on every p o in t, h op efu lly

readers will find their insights help
ful, and that this article furthers the
discussion. X
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